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Credit constraint, informal sector and productivity

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Author(s):
Julia Passabom Araujo
Total Authors: 1
Document type: Master's Dissertation
Press: São Paulo.
Institution: Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade (FEA/SBD)
Defense date:
Examining board members:
Mauro Rodrigues Junior; Gabriel de Abreu Madeira; Enlinson Henrique Carvalho de Mattos
Advisor: Mauro Rodrigues Junior
Abstract

Based on a standard model of entrepreneurship and credit constraints, as proposed by Evans and Jovanovic (1989), this study aims to examine the effects of taxes and credit constraints on agents\' occupational choices. To this, we add the possibility of coexistence of entrepreneurs working in both formal and informal sectors. The main difference between these sectors lies in the fact that the formal one pays taxes and borrows through a collateral, defined by a proportion of the individual\'s wealth. On the other hand, in the informal sector there is no incidence of taxes, but all credit funding should be provided by the firms\' own resources. Both sectors also have different production functions. Additionally, our model adds payroll and earnings taxes of formal enterprises, as well as a labor market clearing condition. Each individual has an endowment of wealth and entrepreneurial skills. The model was calibrated to some characteristics of the Brazilian economy and then simulations were performed on the parameters of credit and taxes. The occupational choices output allows us to measure the effects on efficiency, level of formalization and income inequality of the economy. The calibrated model generates a loss of income of 30%, with the credit constraint having the largest individual effect. The results are more sensitive to tax changes on the formal sector. Payroll taxes have the nontrivial effect of improving the efficiency of overall economy, by discouraging the choice for the informal sector, which is less productive and more labor-intensive. Finally, the credit constraint has a non-monotonic relationship with the equilibrium wage and income inequality. (AU)