Kants Idea of Systematic Unity and its relation with experience

Abstract

In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant exposes the regulative use of the "idea of systematic unity." One of the greatest difficulties of this text is to determine the epistemological status of the regulative use of this idea: is it an idea to be used merely as a logical principle or is it to be used as a transcendental principle? Is it a principle by which one seeks "perfection" for the knowledge of the understanding or is it a principle without which experience itself would not be possible? Although several commentators have addressed this question, the reason why Kant considered that, without the regulative use of the idea of systematic unity, the coherence of understanding and experience itself would not be possible remains obscure. In this research, we intend to show that this question can be resolved if we pay attention to the functioning of the "logical use" of reason when applied to the knowledge of objects in nature. This would allow us to understand that the presupposition of the idea of systematic unity is necessary both for the improvement of empirical knowledge (scientific knowledge in the strict sense) and for the very possibility of experience itself, insofar as it makes possible the formation of empirical concepts.