The problem of freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason: the passage from theory to practice.

Abstract

Kant states in the Critique of Practical Reason that the concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, constitutes the keystone of the entire edifice of a system of pure reason, and even of speculative reason. This seems to indicate that only the second Critique would give centrality to the concept of freedom. However, it is necessary to note that freedom is already central in the Critique of Pure Reason. According to some of Kant's indications, the question of freedom not only constitutes the beginning of critical philosophy as an antinomic problem, but also has a great doctrinal scope for the first Critique, since the resolution of this problem concerns the very possibility of critically understanding the morality. But, despite its importance, the concept of freedom in this work is surrounded by a substantial difficulty. Namely, what Kant says about freedom in the Canon of Pure Reason seems to be contrary to his position in the Transcendental Dialectic. This problem is composed of two difficulties. First, Dialectic asserts that transcendental freedom is an essential part of practical freedom; while the Canon states that transcendental freedom is irrelevant to "the practical". Second, the Canon apparently ignores the results of the Dialectic by stating that practical freedom could be known and proven by experience, which seems to reduce practical freedom (freedom of the will) to natural causality. The present research project proposes to investigate these difficulties and aims to make Dialectic compatible with the apparently conflicting demands of the Canon. To do this, we propose to follow, in part, the reading of Henry Allison, who argues that there is no contradiction between the two points of the work. However, to support his reading, Allison argues that the concept of practical freedom is ambiguous, and that this ambiguity would be present in both the Dialectic and the Canon. This is the point in your reading that we cannot follow. Our hypothesis consists, therefore, in defending an unrestricted concept of practical freedom, without any real ambiguity, which makes it possible to make the two sections of the first Critique compatible and safeguard the doctrinal unity of this work in relation to the concept of freedom.