Action and Responsibility in Legal Philosophy

Abstract

This is a research project submitted for a Post-Doctoral Scholarship in continuous flow by the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP). The present project not only presents the individual research to be developed by the candidate, but also the engagement with other important elements of a researcher's life at the university, such as event organization and teaching. Under the title Action and Responsibility in the Philosophy of Law, the project is divided into three stages. The first stage focuses on the idea of action and what its meanings are. I intend to discuss two paradigms in the philosophy on the subject. On the one hand, the paradigm inaugurated by Donald Davidson, who tries to present a causal theory of action, inspired by the natural sciences. On the other hand, the paradigm inaugurated by authors such as G.E.M Anscombe and Peter Winch, whose focus is the understanding of the concept of action and how people engage with it. The second stage of the project is focused on our practices of responsibility. We are immersed in these practices: we hold others and ourselves accountable all the time. In this second step, I will present a two-level map of our practices of responsibility. For the first level, I will draw primarily on the work of Bernard Williams to present the basic components of any viable conception of responsibility. The second level, in turn, will discuss how we engage in terms of attitudes and emotions with our responsibility practices. The third stage of the project focuses on central discussions on the idea of responsibility in law. As I will argue, the law has the potential to help us understand the more abstract concepts of action and responsibility, while also being illuminated by these more abstract ideas. Within the third stage, I will discuss two paradigms of liability in law: contractual liability and civil liability (torts).The intended research can be articulated around four provisional hypotheses: (I) that legal theory can benefit from a theory of action that does not take the form of the natural sciences, but emphasizes the meanings that action has for individuals. (II) That Bernard Williams provides a useful conceptualization of our practices of responsibility, which helps us to avoid the misunderstandings of theories too focused on notions such as will and intention. (III) That understanding the emotional economy related to our practices of responsibility has a role to play in our understanding of responsibility in the law. (IV) That the law is able to shed light on the ideas of action and responsibility, and that these same notions help us, simultaneously, to understand the law.