The intoxication of reason: the fold of Sufficient Reason in Gilles Deleuze

Abstract

We propose an investigation into the deleuzian interpretation of Leibniz that stems from the approximation between the latter and Nietzsche in Deleuze's work. In Difference and Repetition and The Fold, Deleuze emphasizes the obscure and dionysian side of Leibniz, especially in the notion of small perceptions, which comprise a sort of intoxication. We seek to clarify whether Deleuze's interpretation is to be taken as an explanation of Leibniz, or rather as "duplication" and "perversion" of leibnizian thought that aims at a "neo-leibnizianism" which rejects the Principle of Identity in favor of the primacy of difference. Deleuze seems to operate an inversion or, rather, a "fold" of sufficient reason, which puts it in direct contact with unreason. He brings all foundations to the "bottomless" (sans-fonde). From this primary inversion follows a second inversion of leibnizian concepts, namely, the open monad and the affirmation of incompossibles. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze had already encountered the notion of a "true sufficient reason" which is equated to Nietzsche's will to power. However, we believe that the fold of sufficient reason does not result in a nihilism, nor does it lead to an irrationalism in the common sense of the word. On the contrary, by opening thought to the differential bottomless (sans-fonde) of unreason, Deleuze seeks to make philosophy a creative discipline, defined by the creation of concepts. In his account of philosophy, Deleuze circumvents the alternative between rationalism and irrationalism.