Two essays in global games and deposits insurance

Abstract

This project is composed by two studies in Mathematical Economics. Specifically, the first will analyze the effects of reducing the cost of acquisition and dissemination of information contained in the signals used by individuals in making their decisions in global games settings. To implement this analysis, elements from the structures of global games theory and information theory will be used. I will study under which conditions polarization of positions is the outcome of the system and what are the consequences. The second study is within the framework of dynamic general equilibrium theory. In an economy with financial intermediation (banks), consumers make deposits in these financial intermediaries, which in turn lend resources to firms that may default on their financial commitments. To protect the consumer's deposits, agencies for deposits insurance arise and charge the banks a premium for covering the deposits they receive. Several problems can be studied in this structure. The first one is the definition of the optimal size of the deposit insurance fund and the risk that the deposit insurer will have to face. Another issue is the determination of the insurance premium that the agency must charge to the banks for insuring the deposits they receive. Finally, the analysis of the effects of monetary policies on the system. This study will address these and other questions related to this structure.