THE THIRD TERM OF TRICHOTOMY IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY METHOD: TRANSCENDENTAL SYNTHESIS BY MERE CONCEPTS

Abstract

The Transcendental Doctrine of Method, although exposed in a few pages at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, is of fundamental importance for understanding the method of proof that belongs to critical philosophy and to any philosophy that claims to be science. Despite this importance, not always recognized by Kant's interpreters, it is difficult to understand what the proposal of the critical method consists of. The DTM initially distinguishes the method of mathematics by the construction of concepts, typical of mathematics, and the analysis of concepts, which would be the responsibility of philosophy. Does it mean that Kant excludes synthesis in philosophy altogether, reserving synthesis to the method of constructing concepts in mathematics? If so, we would be facing a dichotomy regarding the critical, non-dogmatic method: either the construction of concepts in mathematics, or the analysis of concepts in philosophy. Schelling criticizes the Kantian proposal following the interpretive line of the dichotomy; to resolve what he considers the kantian impasse, he proposes, as an alternative, the construction of concepts in philosophy itself, since he argues that the method of kantian philosophy would only deal with analysis of concepts unrelated to an intuition, according to his interpretation. We want to show, however, that this is not a dichotomy, since Kant proposes for philosophy a transcendental synthesis through concepts as a key to the enigma to make philosophy a rigorous science. A point little highlighted by commentators in Kantian literature, this synthesis by concepts is the key to understanding the very method of proof adopted by Kant throughout the Critique. An indispensable moment to understand this transcendental synthesis through concepts is the concept of thing in general, which must play the role of sensitive intuition in order to have a synthesis in the discursive use of reason. We want to show that Kant was not restricted to a dichotomous issue (synthesis-construction of concepts X analysis-dismemberment of the notes of a concept) in the proof method, but a trichotomous one, whose third term would be the transcendental synthesis by concepts, ignored by Schelling.