Immediacy and beginning in Hegels science of logic

Abstract

Since the change of meaning of the term immediacy (Unmittelbarkeit) is flagrant in the transition from the first to the second book of Hegel's Science of Logic, this research intends to investigate the possible relation of implication between this change of meaning and the circular resolution that Hegel provides for the problem of the logical beginning. In other words, we intend to understand if and in which way the concept of "reflected immediacy" (which emerges in the opening chapters of the Doctrine of Essence and is opposed to the concept of "immediacy", fundamental in the opening chapters of the Doctrine of Being) has as one of its systematic functions the resolution of the problem of the beginning, which is the conciliation between mediation and immediacy in the logical beginning.The way of posing the problem reveals our more general interpretive hypothesis, according to which there is a relation of direct implication between the change of meaning of the term immediacy in the beginning of the Doctrine of Essence and the analysis of the logical beginning. (AU)