In the "Transcendental Doctrine of the Method" of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant characterizes the method of proof he employed in the "Transcendental Analytics" as a transcendental method of synthesis by mere concepts. It is difficult to understand how a synthesis by concepts is possible, as Kant affirms at various moments in the Critique that all synthetic knowledge requires reference to intuition, as is the case with the mathematical method of concept construction. This problem resonated with German Idealism, so that both Schelling and Fichte argue that Kant, by excluding intuition from the proof method of philosophy, ends up restricting it to the analysis and decomposition of concepts, just like the method of dogmatic metaphysics. However, we intend to show that the method of proof of the Critique of Pure Reason is different from dogmatism, since this method consists of two stages that go beyond the mere empty conceptual analysis. The first stage is found in the "Analytic of Concepts", it is the transcendental deduction that aims to prove the objective validity of the categories; this stage has the essential role of not allowing philosophy, in its proofs, to grope among mere empty concepts of objects, even without having any intuition. The second stage is in the proof of the principles of the understanding of the "Analytic of the Principles"; this stage aims to establish synthetic principles a priori, in a synthesis that has as its guiding thread not pure intuition, but possible experience. The present research, in opposition to the reading that Kant would have proposed an analytical proof method for philosophy, intends to defend that the Critique of Pure Reason proposes in the "Transcendental Doctrine of the Method", and uses in the "Transcendental Analytic", a method discursive synthesis.
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