The social character of social freedoms

Abstract

The Hegelian concept of ethical freedom was understood by the US-American tradition as social freedom: Freedom is only achieved socially, i.e. through the participation of the individual in social institutions. Hegel would certainly not disagree with this definition. There is, however, another concept of social freedom that needs to be better analyzed from the Hegelian thought. For Hegel, the right is the existence (Dasein) of freedom, which allows us to conclude that social right is the existence of social freedom. For the common sense, social right designates the liberties conquered in face of the risks of existence in a capitalist market society. Social right, like any other freedom, presupposes social recognition, so it is possible to affirm that this definition of social freedom as a social right does not contradict the generic US-American version. In my research, I would like to investigate the conception of social freedom both as a social right and as acquired through participation in social and political institutions. However, I'm not intending just to compare these two definitions. Through a social-philosophical analysis of current social and political institutions, my aim is to investigate how willing our society is to recognize social rights. (AU)