The problem of the foundation of philosophy and the proof of the moral law in Reinhold

Abstract

It is mainly about a deepening of current postdoctoral research in the country. To this end, I will focus on some relevant points in relation to the genesis of the foundation of Reinholdian philosophy and its philosophy of the subject. With this in mind, this new investigation strategy will be elaborated in three steps: (1) to examine the integration of the soul doctrine of the chapter of paralogisms with the debate of "I think" in the Kantian transcendental deduction; (2) to investigate the definition of transcendental psychology proposed by Reinhold in the critique of Schmid's Empirische Psychologie. As well as evaluating Fabbianelli's bet on a probable psychologism of Reinhold's theory of consciousness; (3) to ask why the keyconcepts that guide the Letters on Kantian Philosophy of 1792, such as personality, philosophical reason and sane human understanding required a review of the author only two years later. (AU)