Contingency and necessity in Hegel's Science of Logic

Abstract

One of the most common sources of attacks on Hegelian philosophy is the assumption that his logic privileges the modality of necessity to the point that there is no room for contingency within the speculative concept since the task of philosophy would be to overcome the contingent. From Krug's demand to idealism to deduce his plume to Schelling and more recent philosophers who accuse Hegel's philosophy of panlogism, it is the assumption of the need to suppress contingency within the concept that is imputed to the system and more specifically to speculative logic. However, the meaning of the identity between contingency and absolute necessity, with which the Science of Logic chapter on "Actuality" ends, requires a close analysis so that the centrality of contingency, not only for the Science of Logic, but for the whole Hegelian system, is not lost under the weight of necessity and that its ontological status is correctly grasped. In fact, Hegel seems to propose a primacy of the actual over the possible and a necessity of the contingency as essentials aspects of the substance and, hence, of the subject. Thus, taking advantage of the inquiry in the Hegel-Archiv and all debate surrounding Prof. Dina Emundts' research group in Freie Universität Berlin, the aim of this internship project is to investigate Hegel's modal theory, as presented in the Science of Logic's chapter "Actuality", focusing on the ontological status of the notions of necessity and contingency and its role in the realms of nature and spirit. As this section is central to the passage from essence to the concept, it prepares the path for the final presentation of the master's dissertation.