Non-conceptual content in Husserl's logical investigations

Abstract

The research proposes to investigate the contributions of Husserl's phenomenological theory of perception for the contemporary debate about the nonconceptual nature of the content of perception. To do so, it takes as its starting point the immanent reconstruction of the theory of fulfillment of logical investigations, theory that has been dividing the commentators in a conceptualist and non-conceptualist reading of Husserl's approach on perception. According to the conceptualist party, the theory presents an excess of the domain of understanding over sensibility, conceiving the content of perception as already imbued with categorical structures. According to the non-conceptualist interpretation, the theory admits a "simple seeing" that is free of the exercise of concepts and the use of words. We intend to insert ourselves in this debate with a method of analysis that distinguishes two orders of problems: on one hand, it will be evaluated whether the logical investigations espouse a conceptual, non-conceptual, or hybrid view about the perceptual content; on the other, it will be evaluated whether such views are internally consistent, that is, whether they consistently respond to the question about the possibility of intuitive knowledge. Such method of analysis will give us the opportunity, on one hand, to investigate the motives internal to the theory in question that led Husserl's phenomenology to its later developments (bringing up the historical-exegetical pertinence of the research) and, on the other hand, to critically analyze the theory itself (bringing up its properly philosophical pertinence). This last step will be accomplished by confronting Husserl's approach on perception with contemporary ones, especially that of John McDowell. (AU)