Our aim is to analyze and discuss the place occupied by corporeality in Aron Gurwitsch's (1901-1973) theory of attention , interrogating his theses from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception (1908-1961). At first, it is a matter of investigating the theme of attention within the theory of the field of consciousness, having as specific interest Gurwitsch's discussions about the incarnated existence in his theory of the margin of consciousness. The margin constitutes one of the dimensions of the field of consciousness, beyond the theme and the thematic context, and is composed of three orders of existence: the stream of consciousness, the surrounding environment and embodied existence. These orders always accompany any thematic activity and yet, according to Gurwitsch, are materially irrelevant to the thematic process. In a second stage, we question this eminently negative contribution of the margin to the theme, taking Merleau-Ponty's reflections on the body as a critical axis. In contrast, the very thesis of the centrality of corporality in perceptual experience, defended by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception, can be analyzed critically. This project sets up a conceptual research. We propose a level of analysis that is based on the interlocution between Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty, highlighting the tensions existing in the formulation of the problem of the organization of the perceived field and its relation to the experience of the body. The description of the nature of this relationship enables us to address crucial issues concerning the field of developmental psychology, cognitive sciences, and the philosophy of mind, such as the role of self-consciousness, intersubjectivity, and action in the organization of subjective life.
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