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Behavioral agents, fiscal evasion and optimal tax and auditing polices

Grant number: 18/01080-1
Support type:Scholarships abroad - Research
Effective date (Start): January 04, 2019
Effective date (End): October 03, 2019
Field of knowledge:Applied Social Sciences - Economics - Fiscal and Monetary Policies
Principal researcher:Enlinson Henrique Carvalho de Mattos
Grantee:Enlinson Henrique Carvalho de Mattos
Host: Joel Slemrod
Home Institution: Escola de Economia de São Paulo (EESP). Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV). São Paulo , SP, Brazil
Research place: University of Michigan, United States  


My plan is to develop two projects described below. The first one seeks to characterize the optimal audit and taxation policy in the case of having interdependent versus independent agents in an economy with the possibility of tax evasion. This model aims to characterize optimal policies to combat evasion for agents with different personality traits suggesting different policies. We hope to discuss the recent literature on behavioral economics within the area of optimal taxation. The second project seeks to characterize the optimal policy to combat evasion by verticalized firms, but does not collude, and the consumer may or may not be the inspector. We aim to identify the conditions (if and) under which the policy substituição tributaria, widely used in São Paulo, can be considered an optimal policy.

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