Parties or voters: whom do representatives truly serve?

Abstract

Political representation is a fundamental pillar for the legitimacy of the democratic system. This thesis, grounded in an institutional perspective, argues that the representation dynamic involves not only voters and politicians but also political parties. This complexity introduces an environment of pressures and tensions, as politicians must navigate the demands of both voters and parties. Furthermore, it is imperative to emphasize the institutional tension stemming from the mechanisms of the political system, notably the control exerted by party leadership over legislators' behavior through whipping. This dynamic often compels legislators to cooperate with the party, sometimes at the expense of their electoral bases, to maintain the predictability of legislative behavior. This situation could be a reasonable justification for politicians to prioritize party loyalty over individual voter interests. However, original survey data presented in this thesis reveals that this argument does not resonate with even politically sophisticated voters. Even when understanding the necessity of partisan behavior for effective governance and political stability, voters are not lenient with representatives who prioritize party interests over their own. Voters demand to be effectively represented by their elected officials, even amidst the need for partisan cooperation. A means of appealing to the voter's representation is by focusing on "visible policies". This thesis addresses the duality presented in the literature concerning individual earmarks, which often dichotomizes legislators as either directing funds toward their electoral bases or aligning with their parties. Interviews and a quasi-experimental research design demonstrate that legislators, when dealing with "visible policies", allocate resources to both their bases and their parties. It is argued that there is no need to presuppose a strict dichotomy between the interests of voters and those of the party concerning the allocation of parliamentary earmarks. From the voter's perspective, these earmarks represent potential solutions to their everyday problems, while for the parties, they can translate into resources to support an allied mayor or maintain their number of seats in the legislature through the re-election of a deputy who accommodates the demands of their constituents. Nonetheless, there are policies that lead to divergences between voters and parties. Through the case of 2003 pension reform, where costs were concentrated and benefits dispersed, the research illustrates how legislators hesitated to approve a measure that ran counter to the interests of their constituents. It also sheds light on how the Workers' Party (PT) employed negotiation, promises of future political positions, and threats of expulsion to secure the reform's approval. In conclusion, the research underscores the asymmetric relationship between voters and parties, with the institutional system favoring parties over voters. Ultimately, the thesis highlights the importance of striking a balance between representing the interests of voters and addressing the demands of political parties to preserve the legitimacy of the representative system. (AU)