On the Fregean distinction between concept and object and its semantic repercussion

Abstract

In Begriffsschrift (1879), Frege, by replacing the grammatical notions of subject and predicate with the logical notions of argument and function, takes a fundamental step towards the correct regimentation of sentences so as to make it explicit the relevant aspects on determining the validity of arguments in which they appear. Such distinction, in the aforementioned work, refers solely to the linguistic level. Notwithstanding, in later works, particularly in Funktion und Begriff (1892), the distinction is deepened towards a radical semantic split of such linguistic expressions - split which would also reflect an ontological distinction -, namely, the split between saturated entities, called objects and designated by proper names, and insaturated entities, called concepts and designated by first-order predicates. Later on, by introducing the distinction between sense and reference, more explicitly dealt with and developed in Über Sinn und Bedeutung (1892), the issue concerning the semantic content of proper names and, above all, of functional expressions (in particular, of predicates), becomes particularly complex. It is thus necessary to tackle the question of what is, precisely, the semantic content of proper names and of functional expressions, both regarding their respective references and regarding their respective senses, as well as to examine how this fits into the fundamental distinction between objects and concepts, which directs the whole of Frege's philosophical enterprise. (AU)