Within the legislative studies, two models mark the starting points for political science: the US Congress, decentralized in committees; and the British Parliament, centralized in the cabinet. This conformed a dichotomy between centralization and decentralization, which has extended to a duality between strong parties or strong committees, such as the presence of one indicates the absence of another. In the Brazilian case there is a consensus regarding being centralized in the Executive, however, there is a divergence in terms of party strength and, more recently, on the strength of the committees. The hypothesis of this research is that the Brazilian legislative process can be centralized in the Executive and still have at the same time, strong committees and strong parties; since the committees work as means to party leaders consolidate the centralization of the Executive, through the coalition that support this Power. Thus, the strength of the committees can be verified by the role of political parties in recruitment and distribution of preferences in these organs. In this way, as these are essential to the legislative process, it is expected that the parties will strive to have their interests met there. In other words, the party leaders would reward their most disciplined parliamentarians placing them in their preferred committees. The hypothesis will be tested by investigating the composition of committees in every year since 1995, the beginning of the first FHC`s government - (PSDB), by 2014, the final year of the first Rousseff's mandate (PT) and taking as methodological tool the established debate between the three streams of parliamentary action mode: distributive, informational and party.
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