Timeless propositions and the passage of time

Abstract

The philosophical arena of the metaphysics of time is broadly divided between (1) those who think that things change only if reality itself changes, i.e. only if the totality of monadic states of affairs that exists or obtains at a time is different from that which exists or obtains at other times (the Dynamicists); and (2) those who think that what states of affairs constitute reality is not something that depends on what time it is, or on any other temporal perspective (the Staticists). Parallel to this metaphysical distinction is the semantic distinction between the doctrines of Eternalism and Temporalism. According to the former (championed for example by Frege) tensed propositions are not evaluable as true or false as they stand, unless we are given a particular time. In the absence of a time specification, tense propositions are only 'true-at' certain times and 'false-at' others. According to Temporalism, by contrast, propositions may change truth value over time. All these doctrines have highly counterintuitive consequences: Staticism and Eternalism are argued to deny the reality of change and temporal passage, while Dynamicism and Temporalism are argued to be inconsistent. The discussion about these difficulties appears to have reached a stalemate. The general aim of this project is to ease this circumstance by exploring the (rather neglected) inferential relationships between these distinctions. I think that this will allow me to establish a fruitful conceptual interplay between the two domains of enquiry, which in turn will help us to cast new light on their respective conundrums. In particular, I hope this will allow me to provide a clear conceptual explication of temporal passage. (AU)