Psychophysical monism and mixed discourse in Spinoza

Abstract

The Immanent Ontology that Spinoza conceives to human nature is a unity of soul and body. Defined as, respectively, modes of the attributes thought and extension, their existence should be developed as they express the nature of the unique substance, ie, without any causal relation between them, and following the same order of succession and connection of causes. Human actions and affections are explained in order to ensure autonomy and simultaneity to mental and corporeal phenomena, just as it occurs among all other infinite attributes of God. Chantal Jaquet, in order to solve the problems raised by Spinoza's system about the identity of order of different attributes, proposes that the studies on the psychophysical monism should turn to the analysis of the application of the concept of equality in the mixed discourse done by Spinoza when he refers to the mind and body at the same time, in the third book of his ethics. Following these directions, this research aims to study the constitution of Spinoza's psychophysical monism and how it can be better understood through his theory of affects, ie, as stated by the Jaquet herself, where the union of body and mind appears in act (Jaquet , 2011, p. 38). (AU)