Embodied meaning and meaning as use: an investigation on the relations between cognitive linguistics and Wittgensteins philosophy

Abstract

The research proposed here has the goal of clarifying some of the relations between cognitive linguistics and Wittgenstein's philosophy. In cognitive linguistics, Wittgenstein is often pointed out as an author whose thoughts related to language and meaning should be considered. However, the relations between cognitive linguistics and the wittgensteinian views on language and meaning have not been deeply investigated, making it difficult to understand the consequences of the approximation of the two lines of thought. Starting from the notion of meaning proposed by each of these views, this research aims at investigating to what extent the embodied conception of language in cognitive linguistics can establish a dialogue with the public conception of meaning in Wittgenstein. The approach to the question is twofold: Firstly, the research will need to discuss the differences between two domains of investigation, and the opposition between science and philosophy. Secondly and most importantly, the research will deal with the comparison between the explicative models of cognitive linguistics and the descriptive investigations of Wittgenstein, taking into account that cognitive linguistics has a mental and cognitively determined conception of meaning, whereas Wittgenstein advocates for a public and arbitrary conception of meaning.