Intentionality and Pragmatic in Wittgenstein

Abstract

The main aim of this project is to analyze the role that the notion of intentionality plays in the context of Wittgenstein's work, considering the problem of propositional content understanding. In general terms, Wittgenstein argues against the claim that the understanding of a proposition would be reduced to a mental process, in the sense of something in "someone's head". About this question, Wittgenstein's claim is that we do handle with propositions, and these are understood as much as we show ourselves skillful to operate them, that is, we know how use them according certain rules. The point is to inquiry in what extent this rules application in a pragmatical context would show or presuppose a kind of intentional behavior, despite of "internalists" approaches (in the sense of a private psychological process). Our main question is about if the idea of "handle of propositions", as a way to understand its content, give us a good deal to hold up a pragmatical approach to intentionality, according to which what is sight by a intentional state is not, primarily, a object or its representation, but a operation, in the sense of a function (game) to be fulfilled in a specific socio-linguistic context.