Kant’s logic and its ontological presuppositions

Abstract

How should we understand the origins of the distinction between philosophy and science, whose conceptual formulation is usually attributed to Kant? Considering the theoretical use of reason, in view of the impossibility of theology, cosmology and psychology, on the one hand, and the reality of mathematics and physics, on the other, which epistemological status does the Critique of Pure Reason assigns to ontology, understood as Hauptwissenschaft or first philosophy? Instead of claiming the end of any possible ontology, would not be more appropriate to Kant's account of judgment to admit the end of an ontology which reduces phaenomena to noumena, Sinnenwesen to Verstandeswesen? Against neo-Kantians readings of the CPR, we intend to show that what theologians mean by God becomes the logical and ontological space that allows us to judge, the transcendental condition of thinking and being as well. This assumption leads to the question: which ontotheology should be consistent with the Kantian critique of reason? Which anti-dogmatical conception of the ens realissimum could transform God in a necessary presupposition not only of the Critique of Practical Reason, but also of the Critique of Judgment? (AU)