Advanced search
Start date

Kant’s logic and its ontological presuppositions

Grant number: 12/10772-8
Support Opportunities:Scholarships abroad - Research
Effective date (Start): September 10, 2012
Effective date (End): September 09, 2013
Field of knowledge:Humanities - Philosophy - History of Philosophy
Principal Investigator:Luciano Nervo Codato
Grantee:Luciano Nervo Codato
Host Investigator: Desmond Hogan
Host Institution: Escola de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (EFLCH). Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP). Campus Guarulhos. Guarulhos , SP, Brazil
Research place: Princeton University, United States  


How should we understand the origins of the distinction between philosophy and science, whose conceptual formulation is usually attributed to Kant? Considering the theoretical use of reason, in view of the impossibility of theology, cosmology and psychology, on the one hand, and the reality of mathematics and physics, on the other, which epistemological status does the Critique of Pure Reason assigns to ontology, understood as Hauptwissenschaft or first philosophy? Instead of claiming the end of any possible ontology, would not be more appropriate to Kant's account of judgment to admit the end of an ontology which reduces phaenomena to noumena, Sinnenwesen to Verstandeswesen? Against neo-Kantians readings of the CPR, we intend to show that what theologians mean by God becomes the logical and ontological space that allows us to judge, the transcendental condition of thinking and being as well. This assumption leads to the question: which ontotheology should be consistent with the Kantian critique of reason? Which anti-dogmatical conception of the ens realissimum could transform God in a necessary presupposition not only of the Critique of Practical Reason, but also of the Critique of Judgment? (AU)

News published in Agência FAPESP Newsletter about the scholarship:
Articles published in other media outlets (0 total):
More itemsLess items

Please report errors in scientific publications list using this form.