Rules, Grammar and Practice in the Philosophical Investigations

Abstract

The better know interpretations of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations presuppose that his works from 1932 to 1934 (The Big Typescript and Philosophical Grammar) present the same conceptions of "meaning" and "rules" that we can find in the Investigations. As a consequence, these interpretations suppose that these texts can be used to explain Wittgenstein's later conceptions about language and rules. As a result, they cannot make clear the enormous changes in Wittgenstein's conceptions of rules and grammar observed in his transition from the middle period to the Investigations. In this project, we propose a criticism of this presupposition and, as a counterpart, a presentation of the central role displayed by the description of our actual use of language in the Philosophical Investigations, as well as the new conception of rule that unfolds from this criticism. We expect to set the basis for a new perspective of Wittgenstein's late philosophy, in tune with the most recent works on it. (AU)