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Coalition governments and presidential systems: deepening the theory through a presidentialism approach: evidence from Latin America

Grant number: 13/50932-7
Support type:Scholarships in Brazil - Post-Doctorate
Effective date (Start): May 01, 2014
Effective date (End): April 30, 2017
Field of knowledge:Humanities - Political Science - State and Government
Principal Investigator:José Álvaro Moisés
Grantee:Adrián Nicolas Albala Young
Home Institution: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas (FFLCH). Universidade de São Paulo (USP). São Paulo , SP, Brazil

Abstract

Coalition theories applied to governments developed during the last decades a vast literature so as to provide huge theoretical knowledge and tools for the analysis of formation, maintenance and breakdown of this kind of governments. Nevertheless, these studies were focused especially on parliamentary systems and left away the study of this phenomenon on presidential regimes. On another hand, coalition governments used to be considered in the latter systems as an "undesirable combination", or analysed as a functional trend rather than a proper object of investigation. This works conduced then to a very low knowledge level of coalitions under presidential systems, especially in terms of coalition governance. This research then proposes to fill this analytical gap, aiming at comparing recent findings and approaches, from parliamentary to presidential systems. Through the study of Latin American experiments with coalition governments, we will stress the differential roles and mechanisms of some characteristics proper of presidential systems, and their consequences upon party structuration and behaviour. We assume, thus, that coalition governments in presidential regimes differ, in their expression from parliamentary regimes one. Thus, two questions towards emerged towards the interactions of presidential design and the experiment of coalition governments. First of all, does the principle of fixity of president's mandate have an impact on both the achievement of coalition agreements and the coalition governance? Secondly, how does the separation of powers affects the realisation of coalition agreements and coalition governance? To answer those questions we will "presidentialise" the theory, and show that the presidential framework presents general peculiarities like a recurrent pre-electoral coalition formation and a trend towards the bipolarity of party competition. Also we will pay particular attention to the accountability process in the context of coalition presidentialism. (AU)

Scientific publications
(References retrieved automatically from Web of Science and SciELO through information on FAPESP grants and their corresponding numbers as mentioned in the publications by the authors)
ALBALA, ADRIAN. Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities: A configurational analysis of the coalition formation and duration processes. BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, v. 19, n. 4, SI, p. 735-754, NOV 2017. Web of Science Citations: 3.

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